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Implying a Cause of Action Under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
When Richard Nixon signed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 into
law, he declared that it would help "hundreds of thousands of our
disabled citizens attain self-sufficiency."' Ever since he spoke, controversy has brewed over how the original Act's next-to-last provision, section 503, should contribute to that endeavor. Section 503(a)
commands that certain contracts between the federal government
and private contractors contain a provision requiring the contractor
to take "affirmative action to employ and advance in employment
qualified handicapped individuals." 2 Section 503(b) permits such individuals to initiate administrative enforcement of the contract provisions, 3 but the Act is silent regarding direct, private judicial actions
to enforce section 503(a).4 For several years, courts and commentators have disagreed about whether the statutory framework implies
such a private right of action. 5
I. 9 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1197 (Sept. 26, 1973).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. II 1978).
Section 706(7) defines "handicapped individuals" as follows: " 'handicapped individuals'
means any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is
regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (Supp. II 1978).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (Supp. II 1978).
4. This Note uses the phrase "private right of action" to describe a private plaintiff's right
to sue to enforce the employer's duties not to discriminate and to take affirmative action to
assist handicapped individuals. Such a suit would seek appropriate legal and equitable relief,
including reinstatement and back pay. For a discussion of the exhaustion of remedies requirement precedent to this right, see notes 75-77 iefra and accompanying text. The Department of
Labor has obtained back pay and reinstatement as part of conciliation agreements. See note
66 iefra.
5. For cases recognizing a § 503 private right of action, see California Paralyzed Veterans
Assn. v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Clarke v. FELEC Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp.
165 (D. Alaska 1980); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Drennon
v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For cases taking the opposite
view, see Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980); Hoopes v. Equifax, foe., 611
F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979); Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 497 F. Supp. 141, 148-49 (E.D. Mo.
1980); Moon v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1252 (D. Kan. 1980);
Langman v. Western Elec. Co., 488 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Coleman v. Noland Co., 21
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1248 (W.D. Va. 1980); Anderson v. Erie L. Ry., 468 F. Supp. 934 (N.D.
Ohio 1979); Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977).
Various commentators have argued that§ 503 creates a private remedy. See Jacobs, Employment Discrimination and the Handicapped: Some New Teeth far a "Paper Tiger" - The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 23 How. L.J. 481 (1980); Seng, Private Rights of Action, 27 DE
PAULL. REV. 1117 (1978); Wolff, Protecting the Disabled Minority: Rights and Remedies Under
Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 22 ST. Louis L.J. 25 (1978); Note,
Implied Private Rights ofAction Under the Rehabilitation Act of1973, 68 GEO. L.J. 1229 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Implied Rights]; Co=ent, Protecting the Handicappedfrom Employment
Discrimination in Private Sector Employment: A Critical Analysis ofSection 503 ofthe Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 54 TUL. L. REV. 717 (1980); Note, Private Rights ofAction for Handicapped
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A recent amendment to the Rehabilitation Act has fueled the debate. In 1978, Congress added section 505, 6 which permits courts to
award attorney's fees to successful litigants under title V of the Act.
Title V includes section 503. Reasoning that this amendment and its
accompanying legislative history evince congressional approval of a
section 503 private remedy, four District Courts have permitted private suits.7 The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals,
however, have refused to recognize a private right of action 8 on the
grounds that section 505 is too ambiguous to create a section 503
private right of action and that nothing warranted the assumption
that a private right of action had somehow been created before
1978.9
This Note urges courts to recognize a private right of action
under section 503. Part I reviews all the evidence of legislative intent
available today. It concludes that by now the congressional desire
for a private right of action has become abundantly clear. Part II
examines the more difficult issue of when that congressional desire
crystallized into law. It finds ample reliable evidence that a private
right of action has existed since Congress first passed section 503 in
1973.
I. THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION TODAY
The question of whether a statute embodies a private right of
action for its enforcement is "basically a matter of statutory construction."10 And where a statute is silent, the court that construes it
must assess what result Congress most likely desires. 11 That task alPersons under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, 13 VAL. L. REV. 453 (1979). Others have
disagreed. See Guy, The .Developing Law on Equal Employment Opportunity for the Handicapped: An Overview and Analysis ofthe Major Issues, 7 U. BALT, L. REV. 183, 188-95 (1978);
Wright, Equal Treatment ofthe Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26 EMORY L.J. 65 (1977);
Note, Employment Rights of Handicapped Individuals: Statutory and Judicial Parameters, 20
WM. & MARYL. REV. 291 (1978).
In contrast to § 503, courts have generally agreed that § 504 of the Act, which prohibits
discrimination against handicapped individuals by recipients of federal financial assistance,
contains an implied private right of action. See note 39 infta.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (Supp. II 1978).
7. California Paralyzed Veterans Assn. v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Clarke
v. FELEC Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 165 (D. Alaska 1980); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 482 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D.
Cal. 1979).
8. Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611
F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979).
This Note does not directly discuss the Sixth Circuit's brief opinion in Hoopes. The court
reasoned that§ 503 provides an exclusive administrative remedy, and, in one sentence, refused
to infer a private right of action. 611 F.2d at 135. For a rebuttal of the Hoopes argument, see
notes 32-34 infta and accompanying text.
9. See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 61 I F.2d at 1082.
10. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979).
11. Cf. United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J.) ("Flinch as
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ways demands judgment and choice, 12 and jurists seek guidance
from many sources. 13
During the past decade, the Supreme Court has struggled several
times with the question of what sources of guidance are most appropriate in determining whether a statute implies a private right of action. In Cort v. Ash, 14 the Court articulated four "factors" to be
weighed: (1) whether Congress enacted the statute for the especial
benefit of the plaintifl's class, (2) whether the legislative history supports or opposes a private remedy, (3) whether a private right of action is consistent with the statute's underlying purposes, and (4)
whether a federal right of action would impinge on an area of law
traditionally occupied by the states. 15 The list of factors is somewhat
confusing, since it combines one source of guidance 16 with three policy concerns that may rationally be imputed to Congress.17 Nonetheless, the list conveys two clear messages:
(A) In searching for a private remedy, the Court will be guided by the
statutory language read in the light of both the legislative history and
its own assessment of rational social policy; and
(B) In assessing rational social policy, the Court will give special emphasis to three concerns: (i) proportionality between rights and remedies, (ii) efficiency, and (iii) federalism.
In the years since Cort, the Supreme Court has refined the manwe may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of
those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the
concrete occasion."), '!!fd., 345 U.S. 979 (1953).
12. q. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) ("the inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a
basic responsibility of the federal courts").
13. See generally Lehman, How to Interpret a Dtffecult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 489;
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAR.v. L. REv. 863 (1930).
14. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
15. 422 U.S. at 78.
16. Factor (2): The legislative history.
17. Factor (I): A desire to open federal courts only to those with strong personal rights to
vindicate.
Factor (3): A desire for efficient policy implementation.
Factor (4): A concern for federalism.
One could read Cort's first factor as a mere source of guidance (the statutory language
relating to beneficiaries) rather than as a description of a policy value whose relevance must be
analyzed. Indeed, the structure of the Supreme Court's opinions in Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 16-18 (1979), and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 568-71 (1979), might suggest that the Court endorsed such an understanding.
This Note rejects such a reading, since it seems only to require judges to announce a conclusory judgment. Corl required consideration of whether Congress intended to make the
plaintiff an "especial beneficiary" of the statute. Since statutes do not annoint people "especial
beneficiaries" in so many words, it is disingenuous to believe that courts can determine
whether someone is sufficiently "especial" by gazing at the statutory text. Instead, this Note
assumes that the language of "especial beneficiaries" was intended to remind judges that Congress rarely wants to create universal standing to sue. Sensitivity to the value of limited access
to federal courts is a more useful tool than disembodied efforts to determine how "especial"
the statute makes the beneficiary.
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ner in which Cort is applied, asserting that the four factors are not
"entitled to equal weight." 18 The Court has refused to infer a private
cause of action solely on the strength of its own judgments about
rational social policy. Unwilling to create broad ''judicial legislation"19 in this area, an emerging majority20 of the Court has come to
demand a fairly clear signal that Congress contemplated a private
right of action. 21
This Part evaluates the issue of a private right of action under
section 503 in a manner that should prove acceptable to all the Justices on the Supreme Court. It hews to the text and history of the
Rehabilitation Act, allowing the Cort policy concerns to play a
subordinate but supporting role. 22 Each of these traditional sources
18. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
19. This term need not suggest a judicial process that differs in kind from statutory interpretation. "Statutory interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking on a spectrum." P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND \VECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973). Instead, the term ''.judicial legislation" suggests
a difference in degree that corresponds to a shift in primary policymaking responsibility from
legislators to judges. Such a shift may arouse some concern that voters will not be able to hold
their democratically elected legislators to account for the broad government policies that regulate society.
In the context of implied private rights of action, this concern first appeared in the opinions
in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In his Cannon dissent, Justice Powell argued that the Cort test usurps legislative power in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. 441 U.S. at 730-49. Although Justice Rehnquist did not follow Justice Powell's reco=endation that Cort be discarded, his concurring opinion expressed a similar criticism.
According to Justice Rehnquist, Congress, relying on judicial decisions, had come to expect
"the courts to decide whether there should be a private right of action, rather than determining
this question for itself." 441 U.S. at 718. Responding to these fears, Transamerica and Touche
Ross emphasize that congressional intent, not the "desirability of implying private rights of
action" is primary. 444 U.S. at 15. See 442 U.S. at 568. See also Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co.,
634 F.2d 774, 781 n.11 (5th Cir. 1980).
20. The majority comprises Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1979)
(majority opinion).
21. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 783 (5th
Cir. 1980); Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 33 (1979); Note,A New .Directionfor Implied Causes ofAction, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 505
(1980). Cf. Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a .Death Knell Nor
a Moratorium- Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333, 136168 (1980) (arguing that Transamerica and Touche Ross affirm the "continuing vitality" of Corl
and do not signal a more conservative approach).
22. This Note will not discuss the last of the Corl policy concerns (federalism) in the text;
rather it follows the footnote approach of the courts of appeals. See Simpson v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1238 n.23 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay Inc., 611 F.2d 1074,
1078 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980). Section 503 is an antidiscrimination
provision. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 (1979), the Supreme Court
declared that federalism concerns do not preclude a private right of action to enforce "a prohibition against invidious discrimination of any sort." The Court noted that since the enactment
of the Civil War Amendments, ''the Federal Government and the federal courts have been the
'primary and powerful reliances' in protecting citizens against •.. discrimination." 441 U.S. at
708. The Simpson court cited another consideration supporting the same conclusion. With
regard to § 503, the court stated: "Federal interest is even more obvious where, as here, the
factor that triggers application of the statute is the existence of a contractual relationship be-
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of insight into the legislative mind points toward the conclusion that
Congress has created a private right of action to enforce section 503.
A. Textual Support for a Private Right ofAction
Analysis must begin with the text of the statute. Three sections of
the Rehabilitation Act - two enacted in 1973 and one in 1978 demark the boundaries within which a private right of action may be
found.
The first section, 503(a),23 issues the commands that a plaintiff
would like to enforce. It requires that "[a]ny contract [of given size
and subject matter] shall contain a provision requiring that . . . the
party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action
to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals . . . ."
On one level, section 503(a) appears to be a single command: the
contracts must contain the requisite provision. One might be
tempted to say that the statute does no more, that Congress required
contractors to make a promise but did not care whether they keep it.
Indeed, two circuit courts seem to have adopted a variant of that
interpretation. 24
Yet such a view seems excessively crabbed. It suggests that Congress cared more about the phrases in contracts than about the behavioral consequences that follow. Surely the more natural reading
is that in enacting section 503(a) Congress wanted to ensure that
handicapped individuals share in the benefits of government contween the federal government and the defendant." Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d
1226, 1238 n.23 (7th Cir. 1980).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. II 1978). The full text provides:
(a) Any contract in excess of$2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency for
the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction)
for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to
carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative
action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(7) of this title. The provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract in excess of$2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract
for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States. The President shall implement the provisions of this section
by promulgating regulations within ninety days after September 26, 1973.
24. See Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. FritoLay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980).
The Rogers court adopted an even less defensible construction than that given in the text.
It held, "The duty [that § 503(a)) directly creates is imposed upon federal departments and
agencies, not upon contractors." 61 l F.2d at 1079. The court was apparently trying to classify
§ 503(a) among what the Supreme Court had called "simple directives" - statutes primarily
directed to agencies as "a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to ... institutions engaged in discriminatory practices." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
691-92, 693 n.14 (1979) (footnote omitted). But even if one adopted the literalist view that
§ 503(a) only creates a duty regarding the form of the contract, nothing supports the assertion
that the duty is imposed upon the government alone, rather than on the contractor or on both
parties jointly. The statute says that the "contract ..• shall contain" the provision, not "the
.Department ofLabor shall not make contracts unless . • . ."
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tracts. 25 In its regulations implementing section 503(a)26 the Department of Labor adopts this interpretation, stating that the contractor's
affirmative action duty arises "by operation of the Act," regardless of
whether a given contract includes an affirmative action clause.27
Thus, although section 503(a) does not explicitly give handicapped individuals a right to enforcement, the better reading supports two important conclusions. First, the provision was intended
to help handicapped employees of government contractors.28 And
second, the provision gives contractors a duty to implement some
affirmative action program29 and to refrain from discrimination.
25. Such a reading seems more consistent with the overriding statutory purposes. See, e.g.,
29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) ("to promote and expand employment opportunities
in the public and private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in
employment"). The legislative history adds further corroboration. See note 41 iefra.
Such a reading is also more consistent with the assumptions underlying the co=on-law
doctrine giving third-party beneficiaries the right to enforce some contracts. Whether an individual has such a right generally depends on the intent of the promisee. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND} OF CONTRACTS§ l33(l)(b) (1973). In some jurisdictions, however, the right is auto•
matic when the promisor has promised to render a performance directly to or for the third
party. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 600.1405 (1970). See generally J. MURRAY, MURRAY
ON CONTRACTS § 279 (1974). If Congress was at all familiar with this body of law, it is fair to
assume that Congress believed it was giving handicapped employees enforceable rights.
26. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.23 (1980):
By operation of the Act, the affirmative action clause shall be considered to be a part of
every contract and subcontract required by the Act and the regulations in this part to
include such a clause, whether or not it is physically incorporated in such contracts and
whether or not there is a written contract between the agency and the contractor.
27. Where a statute or agency regulations require the insertion of a contractual clause,
courts have held that the duties contained in the clause exist even though the clause has not
been expressly included in the contract. Like § 503, Executive Order 11,246 requires that certain government contracts contain a nondiscrimination clause (Executive Order 11,246 prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin). The Fifth Circuit has held that
Executive Order l l,246's nondiscrimination co=and "is incorporated into the contract, even
ifit has not been expressly included in a written contract or agreed to by the parties." United
States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 469 (5th Cir. 1977). See M. Steinthal &
Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that government convenience
clause required by agency regulations applies even if omitted from the contract). Accord, J.W .
. Bateson Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 566, 569 (1963); G.L. Christian & Assocs., 312 F.2d
418, 424 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 954 (1963).
28. If one understands Cort's first factor to signify the value in limiting access to federal
courts to those individu_als vindicating personal rights, see notes 14-17 supra and accompany•
ing text, it would seem that handicapped individuals are the "especial beneficiaries" of
§ 503(a). Even those district courts that denied a private right of action under§ 503 neverthe•
less conceded that it was enacted for the "especial benefit" of handicapped employees. See
Anderson v. Erie L. Ry., 468 F. Supp. 934, 936 (E.D. Ohio 1979); Wood v. Diamond State Tel.
Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003, 1008 (D. Del. 1977); Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F. Supp.
1308, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 1977), qffd sub nom. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980). Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Tex.
1977), qffd., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980).
29. Section 503 leaves the development of specific affirmative action regulations to the
executive branch: ''The President shall implement the provisions of this section by promulgat•
ing regulations within ninety days after September 26, 1973." 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. II
1978). Agency regulations impose a detailed set of affirmative action obligations on contractors who hold a contract exceeding $50,000 and employ more than 50 employees. See 41
C.F.R. §§ 60-741.5, 60-741.6 (1980).
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The next section, 503(b),30 sets forth a mechanism for enforcing
the rights created under section 503(a). It authorizes handicapped
individuals to file a complaint with the Department of Labor and
requires the Department to investigate and "take such action thereon
as the facts and circumstances warrant."3 I This section emits conflicting signals regarding the congressional attitude toward a private
cause of action. On the one hand, it confirms that Congress intended
section 503(a) to help handicapped individuals by imposing enforceable duties on government contractors. On the other hand, section
503(b) explicitly discusses an administrative remedy while keeping
silent regarding a judicial remedy.
Many courts have interpreted that silence to imply disapproval,
citing the maxim of statutory construction that presumes lists of remedies to be exhaustive.32 But even conceding the utility of such maxims in divining congressional intent, 33 one must resist seeing them as
any more than empirical estimates of likely legislative preference. 34
30. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976). The full text provides:
(b) If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has failed or refuses to comply
with the provisions of his contract with the United States, relating to employment of
handicapped individuals, such individual may file a complaint with the Department of
Labor. The Department shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take such
action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms of such
contract and the laws and regulations applicable thereto.
31. Section 503(b) states that the Department of Labor "shalI" investigate each complaint
and "shalI" take such action as the facts and circumstances warrant. In contrast, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives agencies considerable enforcement discretion: "Compliance
with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected . . . by . . . termination . . . or . . . other means authorized by law." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976) (emphasis
added). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in accord with the holdings of other federal courts,
see Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 991
(1967); Blackshear Residents Org. v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (W.D. Tex.
1972); Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Assn., 341 F. Supp. 1382, 1383-84 (E.D. Va. 1972),
has hinted that a private right of action exists under title VI. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-701 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
418-21 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring).
32. See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, 611 F.2d 1074, 1084-85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
246 (1980); Anderson v. Erie L. Ry., 468 F. Supp. 934, 937-38 (N.D. Ohio 1979). The maxim is
best known in its Latin form: expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
33. Commentators have criticized the exclusio maxim on various grounds. See H. HARTS
& A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
THE LAW 1173-74 (temp. ed. i958); Note, Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes-the
Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARYL. REV. 429, 452 (1976) (exclusio
maxim oversimplifies the nature of the legislative process); Comment, Private Rights ofAction
under Amtrak v. Ash: Some Implicationsfar Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1417 (1975)
(exclusio "attribut[es] to Congress an unrealistic omniscience"); Note, Implying Civil Remedies
.from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 11 HARV. L. REV. 285, 290 (1963) ("While [the exclusio
maxim] expresses a possible reading of the legislature's will, a contrary reading is also plausible.").
34. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1975), indicates
that the Court will apply the exclusio maxim where there is no extrinsic evidence of legislative
intent. In other cases, the Court has employed the principle only where indications of an
intent to deny a private remedy exist. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 20 (1979) (holding that other "evidence of intent . . . in this case . . . , weighs against
the implication of a private right of action . . ."); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
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The maxim must be quickly discarded when more specific evidence
is unearthed. For example, the Supreme Court has supplemented an
express administrative remedy with an implied judicial remedy on
several occasions, most notably under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 196435 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.36
Those findings are especially relevant in the context of section 503,
which was patterned after title VI and title IX.37 Thus, the presence
of section 503(b) gives little help in deciding whether Congress supports a private right of action under section 503(a).
The third section, 505, was not a part of the original Rehabilitation Act. It was added in 1978 in order to remove a perceived obstacle to proper implementation of the Act. It provides: "In any action
or proceeding to enforce a charge or violation of a provision of this
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs."38
Like the two earlier sections, section 505 is not conclusive on the
issue of whether a private cause of action exists under section 503.
The attorney's fee provision clearly contemplates courtroom proceedings to enforce title V ("this subchapter") involving some party
other than the United States. Still, without examining the legislative
history one might be tempted to conclude that Congress had other
proceedings in mind than a section 503 private cause of action.
Conceivably, Congress might have been intending only to provide attorney's fees in private actions to enforce section 504. 39 Yet if
Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458-61 (1974) (legislative history shows that Congress
considered and rejected an amendment authorizing a private right of action); T.I.M.E., Inc. v.
United States, 359 U.S. 464, 470-72 (1959) (statute's structure, administrative interpretation,
legislative history disfavor a private right of action).
35. 42 U.S.C. §2000d (1976). Despite the statute's express administrative remedy, the
Supreme Court, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979), suggested
that Congress also intended to create a private remedy.
36. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
37. See 120 CONG. REC. 30,551 (1974) (statement of Senator Stafford) ("It was the committee's intent that the enforcement under sections 503 and 504 would be similar to that carried
out under section 601 of the Civil Rights Act and 901 of the Education Amendments of
1972.").
38. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (Supp. II 1978).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. II 1978). The section provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
§ 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. The head of each
such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may
take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is so
submitted to such committees.
Courts have generally agreed that § 504 embodies a private right of action. See Hart v.
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that had in fact been the legislative goal, one would have expected to
find narrower language than "a provision of this subchapter." Another possibility would be that Congress intended only to provide
attorney's fees for employers who successfully defended suits by the
Department of Labor. Yet there again, one would have expected to
find language more appropriate to such a narrow goal. A final possibility would be that Congress planned to cover both sections 503 and
504, but wanted only to cover a handicapped person's expenses in
filing an administrative complaint under section 503(b). Yet that
construction seems no more likely than the first two since the attorney's fees associated with an administrative complaint are virtually
nil.40 The most plausible reading is that Congress expected section
505 to help handicapped individuals bring private rights of action
under both sections 503(a) and 504.
To summarize, the language of sections 503(a), 503(b), and 505
gives credence to the notion of a private cause of action to enforce
section 503(a). The statutes assist a special group of people, encourage that group to complain when the section is being violated,
and suggest that the enforcement scheme will involve courts and attorneys' fees. Nonetheless, the smoking pistol is missing. No provision declares, "There shall be a private cause of action." The
County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 69 (N.D. Cal. 1979), and cases listed therein. Dispute
does exist over whether private litigants may file discrimination complaints against all recipients of federal funds or only where the primary objective of the federal assistance is to provide
employment. Compare Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, with Trageser v. Libbie
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 947 (1979). For
a general discussion of the§ 504 case law, see Implied Rights, supra note 5, at 1246-51.
40. The complaint usually includes only the names and addresses of the complainant and
the alleged violator, a description of the alleged violation, and a signed statement that the
discriminatee is handicapped. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-74l.26(c) (1980). An attorney's expertise
should not be needed to compile such information. Once the complaint has been filed, the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) investigates the matter, determines
whether a violation has occurred, and, if so, attempts to work out an informal settlement.
Agency regulations make no provision for the complainant's participation in this process. The
only stage of administrative proceedings where complainants .would require an attorney's
assistance is during formal hearings, where the complainant may participate as a party. See 41
C.F.R. §§ 60-74l.29(b), 60-30 (1980). A contractor may request a formal hearing only if an
agreement has not been reached through informal means or the OFCCP proposes administrative sanctions. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.29(a) (1980). Such proceedings are extremely rare.
During Senate hearings on the 1978 amendments, Donald Ellsburg of the OFCCP testified
that while the OFCCP had found 556 instances of discrimination, only five administrative
complaints had been issued. See Oversight Hearings on the Rehabilitation Act ef 1973 Befare
the Subcomm. on Select Education efthe House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 275 (1978) (letter from Donald Ellsburg, Asst. Secretary of Labor for Employment
Standards, to John Brademas, Chairman, Subco=. on Select Education).
To su=arize, the cost of the attorneys' services in this context is too low to have aroused
congressional concern that expense was deterring administrative enforcement of § 503. See
The Awarding efAttorney's Fees in Federal Courts: Hearings Befare the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration ef Justice ef the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 134 (1977-1978) (statement of Deborah Kaplan, Disability Rights
Center).
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remainder of this Part explores the more explicit, albeit less definitive, evidence to support the requested inference.
B. Legislative History

Where statutory text does not completely resolve an issue of legislative policy, courts seek guidance from the recorded deliberations
of Congress. Although legislative history is not put to a vote of both
houses, it often gives insight into how a majority of the legislators
would have voted if the issue had been raised formally. That insight
is especially powerful where the history accompanies legislation that
is in fact enacted. Unfortunately, the legislative history surrounding
the passage of sections 503(a) and 503(b) in 1973 is silent regarding a
private cause of action. 41 The congressional discussion of other bills
proposed since then, however, does help a court to interpret the statutory language. This Section explores that history in detail.
On several occasions since 1973, legislators introduced bills to
add section 503 to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
explicitly provides a private right of action. 42 On each occasion, the
proposal failed to pass. Although some courts have interpreted those
failures as congressional disapproval of a section 503 private remedy,43 that interpretation is not warranted. It is always dangerous to
draw inferences from a congressional refusal to act: While a "yes"
vote implies general support for an entire bill, a "no" vote only implies dissatisfaction with one of the bill's many components. The
refusals to add section 503 to title VII are a clear case in point; the
debates over the proposed amendments concerned the increased
number of employers who would have been affected, not the merits
41. The 1973 legislative history does, however, confirm that § 503 was intended to give
rights to the handicapped and not merely to impose duties on the Department of Labor. See
notes 24-25 supra. Drafters of§ 503 spoke of the provision as vesting handicapped individuals
with a "right" to nondiscrimination and affirmative action. See 119 CoNG. REC. 6145 (1973)
(remarks of Senator Humphrey) ("The requirement in this bill for an affirmative action program, under which Federal contractors shall undertake to employ and advance in employment
qualified handicapped individuals, is an important step toward fulfilling the intent of my bill
to prohibit discrimination in employment solely on the basis of such handicaps ..• •"); S.
REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 6373,
6425 (letter from Senator Williams, chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, to Secretary of Labor Brennan regarding ''the delay in the implementation of§ 503,"
in which Senator Williams stated: "Section 503 . • • was specifically designed to assure that the
right to decent and fulfilling jobs for disabled individuals would be enforced with respect to all
_ employers holding Federal contracts of $2,500 or more."); Bayh, Foreword lo the Symposium
Issue on Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 27 DE PAULL. REV 943, 949 (1978).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f){l) (1976). The following proposed amendments to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have never gathered sufficient support for passage: H.R. 246.
461, 1107, 1200, 1995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1311, 1757, H.R. 1346, 1886, 2515, 3497,
4624, 4625, 4626, 5016, 7016, 7754, 7758, 7946, 8028, 8417, 12,541, 94th Cong. (1975-1976); S.
1780, H.R. 1120, 2685, 10,960, 11,986, 12,654, 12,916, 13,199, 13,200, 93d Cong. (1973-1974);
H.R. 10,962, 92d. Cong. (1972). See 42 U.S.C. § 2003-S(f)(l) (1976).
43. See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1977), affd. on
other grounds, 6ll F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980).
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of a private cause of action.44
In 1974, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to clarify the
definition of"handicapped person."45 The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare concerning those amendments
declared that section 504 of the Act permits "a jU:dicial remedy
through a private action." 46 The report failed to menfion, however,
whether the committee understood section 503 to permit a similar
remedy. Some statements in the report could be read to confirm
such an understanding, but the better view is that those statements
concerned a different issue. 47
The most illuminating legislative history accompanied the passage of the 1978 attorney's fees amendment, section 505. Congress
enacted section 505 in response to fears that that expense was dissuading handicapped employees from vindicating their rights. 48 The
44. The jurisdictional limits of§ 503 and title VII differ. Section 503 affects only federal
contractors; title VII reaches all public and private employers of any size. The available evidence suggests that the amendments were proposed in an effort to expand § 503's jurisdictional
limitations. Senator Dodd, for example, has indicated that he proposed adding § 503 to title
VII not in order to permit private suits, but rather to extend coverage of § 503 to private
employers. See Oversight Hearings on Rehabilitation efthe Handicapped Bifore the Subcomm.
on the Handicapped efthe Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I, at
321-22 (1976) (statement of Senator Dodd). Commentators have also cited§ 503's jurisdictional limits as the strongest reason for adding § 503 to title VII. See Comment, The Rights ef
the Physically and Mentally Handicapped· Amendment Necessary to Guarantee Protection
Through the Civil Rights Act ef 1964, 12 AKRON L. REV. 147, 157 (1978) ("The chief inadequacy of the Rehabilitation Act is that it applies only to public employment or employment
with federal contractors"); Note, Potluck Protections far the Handicapped .Discriminatees: The
Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit .Discrimination on the Basis ef.Disability, 8 LOY. CHI. L. J.
814, 835, 844 (1977) (the jurisdictional limitations of§ 503 are a "basic inadequacy" of the Act
and form the strongest argument for adding § 503 to title VII).
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. II 1978).
46. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6373, 6391; note 39 supra.
47. Soon after it endorsed a private § 504 remedy, the Committee Report stressed that
§§ 503 and 504 are intended to "be administered in such a manner that a consistent, uniform,
and effective Federal approach to discrimination against handicapped persons would result."
Id Viewed in isolation, the juxtaposition of these two statements suggests that the Committee
contemplated a § 503 private remedy.
This reading, however, becomes less plausible when the uniformity language is placed in
context. The pargraph in which it appears bespeaks a concern for administrative enforcement
of§§ 503 and 504, not, as in the preceding paragraph, with a private right of action. As one
court realized, the report most likely meant that ''the two responsible agencies were not to
work at cross purposes or to duplicate each other's efforts." Anderson v. Erie L. Ry., 468 F.
Supp. 934, 939 (N.D. Ohio 1979). See Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F. Supp. I 165,
1169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The remarks of Senator Stafford, a member of the Committee that
authored the Senate Report, support the Anderson court's interpretation. See 120 CONG. REc.
30,551 (1974) (remarks of Senator Stafford).
48. Senator Cranston, the author of the attorney's fees provision of the amendment and a
member of the Senate Committee that considered and reported the bill, stated:
[I]n many, many cases arising under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the handicapped individual has little money to hire and pay an attorney. . . .
The amendment adopted by the committee would help assure that handicapped individuals will be able to have access to the judicial process in order to assert their rights
under title V.
.
124 CONG. REc. S15,590 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of Senator Cranston).
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Senate Report accompanying section 505 49 gives irrefutable evidence
that a section 503 private cause of action is one of the tools that
Congress expected would be used to vindicate those rights. It proclaims, "[T]he availability of attorney's fees should assist in vindicating private rights of action in ... [section] 503 cases . . . ." 50
Furthermore, it is easy to impute the clear understanding of the
Senate Committee to the entire 1978 Congress. The conference committee chose to adopt the final statutory language recommended by
the Senate Report. 51 And statements made during floor debates52
before passage of section 505 confirm Congress's agreement with the
Senate Committee's statement. 53 Thus, Judge Goldberg accurately
assessed the evidence when, dissenting in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc. ,54
he concluded, "The attorney's fees provision of the 1978 Amendments constitutes an unimpeachable statement by Congress that it
understood section 503 to include an implied private remedy
"55

While conceding the potential significance of this legislative history, the Fifth Circuit in Rogers nonetheless chose to disregard it.
The court concluded that the 1978 committees had made an unwar49. S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978).
50. Id.
51. See H.R. REP. No. 1780, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1978).
52. See 124 CONG. REC. SIS,590-91 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of Senator Cranston). Senator Cranston was a member of the Committee that produced the Report on§ 505.
Senator Bayh also spoke of the "continuing intention of Congress that private actions be
allowed under ... title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." Id. at SIS,593.
Note also that the Senate Committee Report's explicit recognition of a § 503 private action
went unchallenged and uncontradicted during debate and passage of§ 505. See 124 CoNo.
REC. SIS,647-74 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. Hl3,469-76 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
1978).
Finally, consider the statement of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
after § 505 was passed:
It is, and has always been the Committee's intent that any handicapped individual
aggrieved by a violation of title V has the right under existing law to proceed privately in
federal court to enforce the rights and remedies afforded under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and to receive back pay and attorney's fees if successful.
S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1979).
53. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the statements during floor debates "could be interpreted to mean that Congress had intended to create private rights of action in sections of
Title V other than§ 503(a)." Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1242 n.31 (7th
Cir. 1980). But Senator Cranston was more explicit:
Mr. President, the rights extended to handicapped individuals under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... , employment under Federal contracts, ... are and will
continue to be in need of constant vigilance by handicapped individuals to assure compliance. Private enforcement of these title V rights is an important and necessary aspect of
assuring that these rights are vindicated and enforcement is uniform. The availability of
attorneys' fees should assist substantially in this respect.
124 CONG. REC. SIS,590 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978). When placed in the context of the Senate
Reports accompanying § 505 and following its enactment, see note 52 supra, the Simpson
court's "alternative understanding" seems most unlikely.
54. 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980).
55. 611 F.2d at 1097 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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ranted assumption "that a private cause of action had somehow been
created in the past." 56 "An assumption," the court declared, "is not a
law." 57
The Rogers reasoning misconceives the issue at stake in applying
sections 503 and 505. The private right of action was much more
than a mere "assumption" of a few legislators; it was the principal
motivation for a new statute. By permitting successful litigants to
recover attorney's fees, Congress sought to encourage such suits to
make them as attractive and effective as possible. 58 When that legislative wish was ratified through "a positive legislative enactment," 59
it indeed became "a law."60 As the Supreme Court has said: "Where
congressional intent is discernible . . . we must give effect to that
intent."61
C. The Private Right ofAction and the Rehabilitation
Act's Purposes
In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court appeared willing to weigh
considerations of social policy carefully before inferring a private
56. 611 F.2d at 1082. Accord, Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1243 (7th
Cir. 1980).
57. 611 F.2d at 1082.
58. See S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978); statements of Senators Cranston
and Bayh, supra note 52.
59. Clarke v. FELEC Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Alaska 1980).
60. The assumption-law dichotomy confuses analysis because it fails to distinguish retrospective "assumptions" from prospective "assumptions." If a congressional assumption about
the past is incorrect, it can have retroactive legal effect if and only if explicit retroactive legislation would be valid. In contrast, any congressional "assumption" about the future state of the
law must be given legal effect, in accord with the courts' duty to implement legislative intent
whenever possible.
Where Congress makes an assumption about past law that is simultaneously an assumption
about future law, and where the assumption about past law is erroneous, a court will find an
implied amendment to the past law. The doctrine of the implied amendment is usually invoked when "the terms of [a] subsequent act are so inconsistent with the provisions of[a] prior
law that they cannot stand together." IA C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 22.13 at 140 (4th ed. 1972). See id. at§§ 22.22, 23.09, 23.12 and cases cited therein. If
the Rogers-Simpson view of § 503 as originally enacted is correct, then §§ 503 and SOS are
clearly inconsistent. But see Part II infra, arguing that Rogers and Simpson erroneously interpreted the intent of the 1973 Congress.
Even where the earlier and later enactments do not clearly conflict, courts interpret the
earlier legislation in light of the later to give effect to the subsequent enactment. See, e.g. ,
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 594 F.2d 470, 476-81 (5th Cir. 1979) (court gave weight to
subsequent legislative expressions where the original legislative history was "unenlightening"
on the "precise point in issue"); Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329, 341-43
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 395 (1976) (court used subsequent amendments to fill a
"gap" left by original legislation: ''To hold [otherwise] •.. would render the amendments
pointless and ineffectual"). The courts seem concerned with giving full effect to the subsequent
enactment, whether or not the subsequent Congress accurately perceived the earlier Congress's
intent. See, e.g., Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (Court
used 1971 House report to construe 1936 Act where "the precise intent of the enacting Congress [was] obscure"); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, SOS (1973) (court gave weight to a 1942
statute in interpreting the 1892 Congress's intent). See also notes 78 & 82 infra.
61. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962).
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cause of action to enforce a statute. 62 More recent opinions have
made it clear that such policy considerations will not alone justify
judicial action, especially in the face of contrary statutory language
or legislative history. 63 But where - as with the Rehabilitation Act
- the statutory language suggests a cause of action, and where the
legislative history suggests so even more clearly, analysis of social
policy remains essential.
As was mentioned above, section 503(a) was designed to enhance
the opportunities of handicapped employees of government contractors. 64 At first blush, it would appear that private judicial enforcement of section 503(a) could only promote the congressional goal.
Those with the most to gain - handicapped employees - would
seem best placed to detect and prove violations, while the risk of
penalties might encourage contractors to comply. Nevertheless, several courts have expressed concern that a private right of action
would frustrate the statutory purpose by impeding the Department
of Labor's efforts to resolve complaints through informal conciliation. 65 This Section attempts to show that such a concern is unwarranted, that in fact a private right of action, coupled with an
exhaustion requirement, complements and reinforces informal efforts at conciliation.
The courts that have suggested that a private right of action
would stifle efforts at conciliation assume that the Department of Labor's activities under section 503(b) place sufficient pressures on employers that they tum conciliatory. Sadly, that is not the case. The
Department's ever-increasing backlog of unprocessed cases seriously
impairs effective enforcement of section 503. 66 In 1978 the Depart62. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 25 & 41 supra.
65. See, e.g., Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1243 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1084 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980); Anderson
v. Erie L. Ry., 468 F. Supp. 934, 937-38 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
439 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 41 C.F.R. § 60-74l.28(a) (1980) provides: "In every
case where any complaint investigation indicates the existence of a violation ... , the matter
should be resolved by informal means, including conciliation, and persuasion, whenever possible."
66. Some district courts have contended that, apart from the Department's swelling backlog, the administrative remedies provided in § 503(b) are inadequate to protect the handicapped from discrimination and to promote job opportunities for them. See Chaplin v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F. Supp. 1165, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hart v. County of
Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 75 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Although those contentions have some merit,
they are seriously overstated.
Administrative regulations permit the Department of Labor to punish violations by withholding progress payments, terminating the contract, or debarring the contractor from future
contracts. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28 (1980). Such sanctions, however, are quite severe; absent
widespread or gross violations, the Department is reluctant to impose them. See Morgan,
Achieving National Goals Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an Unconstrained Admin•
istrative Process, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 301, 333-37 (discussing the extremity of such remedies
from the points of view of both federal contractors and federal agencies). In fact, as of 1978,
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ment had a backlog of 1270 cases and by the end of the first three
quarters of 1979, the number had jumped to 2136.. 67 Consequently,
the Department takes the position that "a private right of action
would be consistent with Congress's intent, and would greatly assist
the Department of Labor's effort to enforce section 503." 68 The
Supreme Court, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 69 gave great
weight to similar agency representations. Citing the agency's admission that it lacked adequate enforcement resources, the Court stated
that the agency's position that private suits would make enforcement
more effective was "unquestionably correct." 70 A private section 503
remedy would decrease the Department of Labor's backlog of cases
and provide more efficient enforcement of the statute's commands.71
Even if the Department of Labor had no backlog, there is no
reason to believe that a private right of action would undermine the
Department's efforts to resolve disputes informally. The prospect of
litigation can have a sobering effect on both employers and employees, encouraging them to resolve their differences with the help of an
administrative mediator. Congress has recognized this truth in other
contexts72 and the Department of Labor has endorsed it with regard
the Department had issued no termination or cancellation orders. See Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Select Education ofthe House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 275 (1978) (statement of Donald Elisburg, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employment
Standards) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings].
Proponents of a private right of action have correctly observed that effective enforcement
of § 503 requires less severe sanctions such as back pay, reinstatement, or injunctively prescribed affirmative action. See Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F. Supp. 1165, 117172 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 75 (N.D. Cal. 1979). q:
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-05 (1979) (discussing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). But contrary to the views of the Hart and Chaplin courts, such
less severe remedies are already available in § 503 administrative proceedings. As part of its
conciliation agreements, the Department of Labor has sought and obtained reinstatement and
back pay awards. See 1978 Hearings, supra, at 257; OFCCP v. E.E. Black, Ltd., 19 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1624, 1635-36 (1978).
67. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 66, at 275 (table of unprocessed complaints); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1108 (5th Cir. 1980) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (Affidavit of
Weldon J. Rougeau, Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Department of Labor; table of unprocessed complaints).
68. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at l 108. See California Paralyzed Veterans Assn. v.
FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 482 F. Supp.
1165, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
69. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
70. 441 U.S. at 708.
71. This would be true even assuming that a § 503 private right of action would be subject
to some type of exhaustion requirements. See notes 75-77 i'!fra and accompanying text.
72. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976), emphasizes
conciliation and voluntary settlement. Yet, as the Supreme Court noted, "Many members [of
Congress] felt that private enforcement of Title IX was entirely consistent" with the general
enforcement scheme. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 686 n.7.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is also illustrative. Title VI directs federal agencies
to employ persuasion before imposing more formal sanctions yet, as the Court suggested in
Cannon, Congress intended that title VI create an implied right of action. See 441 U.S. at 694-
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to section 503. 73
A court should not resist the Government's conclusion that a private right of action would bolster efforts at conciliation.74 Moreover,
a concerned court can guarantee that the Department of Labor retains a vital role in enforcing section 503 by fashioning a requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before litigation.75
The approach that seems to strike the best balance between fostering
agency conciliation and ensuring an effective private right of action
is an exhaustion scheme patterned after the one used under title
VII.7 6 Under such a system, courts would require exhaustion except
in two situations. First, the Department of Labor could waive the
requirement whenever it chose. This exception would permit the
Department to relieve its backlog, protect its opportunity to conciliate, and devote its resources to the uses it deems most productive.
Second, a court could waive the requirement if the plaintiff shows
that the Department has not taken timely action. This exception,
which courts have allowed in other areas,7 7 would ensure that a
plaintiffs claim is heard and decided promptly.
Th~s, a proper construction of the Rehabilitation Act, as
amended, must include a private right of action to enforce section
503(a), together with an appropriate exhaustion requirement. That
is the only construction fully consonant with the Act's language, history, and undisputed purposes.
JI.

WHEN

DID

CONGRESS CREATE THE PRIVATE
CAUSE OF ACTION?

Part I demonstrated that a court studying section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act in 1981 should conclude that handicapped employees now have a private right of action to enforce that section. The
13. See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1108 app. (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 246 (1980).
14. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 706 n.41 (in response to the argument
that a private right of action would interfere with agency conciliation, "[t]he simple answer
. . . is that the Government itself perceives no such interference").
75. Proponents of a§ 503 private remedy have generally recognized an exhaustion requirement, see, e.g., Hart. v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 71 n.7, 76 (N.D. Cal. 1980), but
appear willing to create an exception where the Department has delayed processing the plaintifl's complaint. See California Paralyzed Veterans Assn. v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125, 131-32
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (exhaustion held inappropriate because Department's investigation lasted
over one year); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. at 71 n.7 (plaintiff held to satisfy
exhaustion requirement because he had obtained an initial agency determination and experienced considerable delay on appeal to the agency director).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976). Thirty days after taking jurisdiction over a title
VII complaint, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may allow the complainant
to institute a private judicial action by issuing a right to sue letter. After the Commission has
had jurisdiction over a complaint for 180 days, the Commission can no longer require that a
complainant pursue administrative remedies; the complainant has a right to litigate his claim
in federal court.
17. See, e.g., Walker v. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966). See also note 75 supra.
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remainder of this Note discusses a problem whose significance will
fade over time, but that presently concerns a large class of potential
plaintiffs: When did Congress create the cause of action, 1978 or
1973? A quick reading of Part I may have led one to conclude that
Congress did not create the cause of action until it enacted the attorney's fees provision, section 505, in 1978. A more methodical study,
however, will reveal that the insights which compel a court to find a
private right of action in 1978 are equally compelling evidence of the
1973 Congress's intent.
One should begin by asking which of the factors weighed in Part
I are less potent when the inquiry is focused on the year 1973. The
language of section 503 was the same in 1973 as in 1978. The concern for handicapped employees as a "special class of beneficiaries"
was the same. And so was the interest in effective informal conciliation. The only troubling difference is that a court sitting in 1973
lacked the attorney's fees amendment and its accompanying legislative history.
And yet, the 1978 legislative history embodied two judgments:
(1) what the 1978 Congress desired for the future, and (2) what it
believed the intent of an earlier Congress had been in 1973.78 Thus,
that history is relevant to a modern analysis of the state of the law
since 1973. Indeed, both precedent and logic suggest that the newer
legislative history should be accorded great weight in determining
the 1973 Congress's intent.
The cases divide over whether a subsequent Congress's interpretation of a statute enacted by another Congress deserves weight.79
Some have refused to rely on such evidence, fearing that the mem78. See notes 48-54 supra and accompanying text.
Someone hostile to a private right of action under § 503 might concede that Congress created a private remedy in 1978 but reject the second assertion in the text. Such a cynic might
argue that the 1978 Congress was not really shedding light on earlier congressional intent but
was rather trying covertly to create a retroactive remedy. The cynic might then argue that such
retroactive legislation would violate the fifth amendment's due process clause.
This Note does not attribute such skulduggery to the 1978 Congress, preferring to take the
legislators at their word. Nevertheless, it bears remarking that retroactive creation of a private
right to enforce § 503 would not violate the fifth amendment. The retroactive right of action
would expose employers to no greater liabilities than they face under§ 503(b). See note 66
supra. And even if new, more extensive remedies were created, they could only be obtained
from an employer who violated a duty that was clear since 1973. The Supreme Court has
upheld far more sweeping retroactive creations of liability. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. l, 20-27 (1976) (upholding the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, which required employers to pay benefits to miners who had left employment before the Act's effective
date).
19. Compare International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39
(1977), United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405,411 (1962), Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 376-77
(7th Cir. 1978), United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1976), and Massachusetts
Medical Socy. v. United States, 514 F.2d 153, 153-54 n.l (1st Cir. 1975), with NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974), Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
380-81 (1969), Amchem Prods., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 594 F.2d 470,477 (5th Cir. 1979), Esquire,
Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd.,
588 F.2d 723, 731 (9th Cir. 1978).
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hers of the later Congress have not expressed the understanding of
an earlier congressional majority. The views of a much later Congress may be uninformed.so The 1970 Congress, for example, was no
better situated than a court to know the unstated intent of the 1940
Congress. Similarly, even though close in time to the enacting Congress, members of the subsequent Congress may hold views that differ from those of an earlier majority. Where there is doubt that the
opinions voiced by a few Congressmen commanded majority support in the later Congress, it is also unlikely that the earlier Congress
would have embraced those views.s 1 Other cases have not been determined by such concerns, and courts have relied upon a subsequent Congress's declarations.s2 For example, in Cannon v.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962) (views of 1914 Congress not
relevant to interpretation of 1890 Act); Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1978) (no
weight accorded to views of 1971 congressman regarding 1909 act); Massachusetts Medical
Socy. v. United States, 514 F.2d 153, 153-54 n.1 (1st Cir. 1975) ("The opinion of the 1969
Congress . . . as to the validity of the regulations as an interpretation of the statute enacted by
another Congress in 1950 is entitled to little or no weight.").
81. See, e.g., CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-19 (1980) (Court refused to
rely on, inter alia, a post-enactment statement of a legislator who had not sponsored original
bill, but instead had authored a bill "less restrictive" than the original); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,354 n.39 (1977) (co=ents by subsequent congressmen regarding the earlier act did not form the basis of the subsequent legislation); United
States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 311-12 n.7 (1960) (Court declined to draw inferences from later
Congress's failure to enact a proposed amendment); Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774,
790 (5th Cir. 1980) (court attributed no significance to 1975 assumptions of two legislators
regarding 1974 act where "[t]here was no indication .•. that this assumption was shared by
the remainder of Congress"); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1976) (in
interpreting earlier legislation court refused to rely on statements regarding a then unpassed
bill). Even though subsequent expressions may not accurately capture the earlier Congress's,
intent, courts may rely on them if they form the basis of an enactment of the subsequent.
Congress. Here the court is primarily concerned with implementing the design of the later'
statute rather than interpreting the earlier Congress's intent.
82. When interpreting earlier statutes, courts have given weight to statements about the
earlier statute on which the later Congress has relied when passing legislation of its own. In
this situation, the court has assurance that the interpretation of the earlier statute was held by a
majority of the later Congress. See CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13
(1980). Especially where many of the same members are present in both Congresses, it is likely
that the later Congress's interpretation reflects the understanding of the earlier Congress. See
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 686-87 n.7 (1979) ("[W]e would be remiss ifwe
ignored these authoritative expressions . . . ."); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 594 F.2d
470 (5th Cir. 1979) (Congress enacted amendment clarifying ambiguity in earlier act); Pierce &
Stevens Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 585 F.2d 1382, 1387 n.23 (2d Cir. 1978) (legislative statements
are entitled to weight where they are made in the context of amending a statute by members of
Congress who were involved in the development of the original legislation); Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Assn., Inc. v. Butz, 504 F.2d 168, 173, 176-77 (8th Cir. 1974) (court used legislative
history of 1973 amendment to construe 1972 act).
Where the view of the subsequent Congress regarding earlier legislation forms the basis of
a subsequent enactment, courts give effect to that view regardless of the danger that the subsequent Congress did not accurately perceive the earlier Congress's intent. See, e.g., Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969) (Court gave effect to 1959 amendment
declaring meaning of term in 1927 act); United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420,
436 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court relied on 1974 amendments to clarify definition of term in 1966
legislation). For a discussion of this practice, see note 60 supra.
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University of Chicago 83 the Supreme Court held that Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 197284 includes a private right of action.
As part of its reasoning, the Court examined an attorney's fees provision added by Congress in 1975. 85 The Court noted that the language and the legislative history of the later provision indicated that
many members of Congress had assumed that title IX authorized
private suits and had believed that private enforcement was consistent with and necessary to enforcement of title IX. While the Court
did not accord these views "the weight of contemporary legislative
history," the Court did state: "[W]e would be remiss if we ignored
these authoritative expressions concerning the scope and purposes of
title IX . . . ." 86
The concerns that typically cause courts to disregard a later Congress's views as evidence of an earlier Congress's intent do not apply
in the case of section 505. 87 There is ample evidence that the 1973
Congress would have endorsed the 1978 Congress's conclusion that
section 503 creates a private right of action. First, the drafters of
section 505 were indeed better placed than a court to know the intent
of the 1973 Congress. Ten of the seventeen members of the Senate
Committee that drafted and twice approved section 503's language88
also served on the 1978 Senate Committee that reported that section
505 applies to private section 503 suits. 89 Senators Stafford and
Cranston, who preached the necessity of private rights of action
under title V during the floor debates on section 505,90 had both
served on the 1972 and 1973 Committees. No judge could be so intimately aware of the original understanding of section 503.
83. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
84. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
85. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 685-87 & n. 67 (1979) ..
86. 441 U.S. at 687 n.7.
87. Conceivably, a court also might resist using a later Congress's understanding to interpret an earlier Congress's intent out of fear that the legislature was speaking to escape accountability to the voters. Thus, the earlier Congress could avoid explicitly validating a politically
sensitive interpretation of its statute; and the later congress could validate that interpretation
while insisting that it was bound to the earlier Congress's intent.
Whatever the force of such an argument in other contexts, it has none in the case of§ 503.
The later Congress was clearly accepting full political responsibility for the continuation of the
private right of action, since it strengthened that right with§ 505. See note 19 supra.
88. Senators Williams, Randolph, Pell, Kennedy, Nelson, Eagleton, Cranston, Javits,
Schweiker, and Stafford were members of both the 1978 and the 1972-1973 committees. See
Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. ii (1973) (list of committee members); Rehabilitation Act of1972: Hearings Before the Subcomm. ofthe Handicapped ofthe Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. ii (1972) (list of committee
members).
89. See 124 CONG. REc. app. (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (listing members of the Human
Resources Committee).
90. See note 52 supra.
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Second, courts need not fear a change in congressional purpose
between 1973 and 1978. Because of the overlapping composition of
the two Congresses, simple nose counts !eveal that the 1973 Congress
shared the 1978 Congress's views. Of the eighty-eight Senators who
voted on section 503 in 1973, forty-nine subsequently voted in favor
of the 1978 Amendments. 91 Three hundred ninety-seven Representatives voted on the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. Two hundred of them
supported the 1973 Act and later voted for the 1978 Amendments. 92
Only one Congressman voted against the 1978 Amendments but
supported the 1973 Act.93
The evidence thus belies the Rogers court's assertion that section
505 is "the product of members of a Congress so distant in time from
the enacting Congress that we cannot accept their remarks as an accurate expression of the earlier Congress's intent." 94 Section 505 is
not mere "commentary";95 rather, it represents a reliable clarification of the 1973 Congress's intent to create a private section 503 remedy.
CONCLUSION

As it stands today, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, understood
through its text, legislative history, and purposes, authorizes private
suits to vindicate rights under section 503. Courts should effectuate
legislative intent by recognizing, at least, a section 503 private right
of action from the effective date of section 505. Due to administrative delays, however, suits will continue to be decided for a number
of years under section 503 as it stood prior to the 1978 Amendments.
Courts must therefore decide whether section 503, as originally enacted, authorizes private suits. The language of the statute and the
best available evidence of the 1973 Congress's intent both support a
private right of action under section 503. The judiciary should construe the Act accordingly.

91. See 124 CONG. REC. SlS,673 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1978) (vote of the Senate); 119 CONO,
R.Ec. 29, 633-34 (1973) (vote of the Senate).
92. See 124 CONG. REc. H13,476 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (vote of the House); 120 CONO,
REc. 18,137-38 (1973) (vote of the House).
93. Senator Proxmire voted in favor of the 1973 Act, but opposed the 1978 Amendments.
There is no evidence, however, that Senator Proxmire voted against the Amendments because
they were predicated on the understanding that a § 503 private right of action exists.
94. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1082 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246
(1980).
95. 611 F.2d at 1082.

